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We test the hypothesis that the government bond markets in the
Eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulﬁlling
liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We ﬁnd evidence that
a signiﬁcant part of the surge in the spreads of the peripheral Euro-
zone countries during 2010–11 was disconnected from underlying
increases in the debt to GDP ratios and ﬁscal space variables, andwas
associated with negative self-fulﬁlling market sentiments that
becamevery strong since the endof2010.Weargue that this candrive
member countries of the Eurozone into bad equilibria. We also ﬁnd
evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, inves-
tors became increasingly worried about this in the Eurozone, and
reacted by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-
alone countries despite the fact that debt to GDP ratios and ﬁscal
space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis that erupted in the industrialized world in 2007 forced governments to save
their domestic banking systems from collapse and to sustain their economies that experienced their
sharpest postwar recession. As a result, these governments saw their debt levels increase dramatically.
Fig. 1 shows this for the US, the UK and the Eurozone.
Fig. 1 is also interesting for another reason. We observe that the increase in the debt to GDP ratios
since 2007 is signiﬁcantly faster in the US and the UK than in the Eurozone, so much so that at the endEconomics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.
e Grauwe), yuemei.ji@econ.kuleuven.be (Y. Ji).
 BY license.
Fig. 1. Gross government debt in Eurozone, US and UK (% of GDP). Source: European Commission, Ameco
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Eurozone that has experienced a severe sovereign debt crisis and not the US nor the UK. The severity
of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows the spectacular
increase in the spreads of a large number of Eurozone countries. The spreads are deﬁned as the
differences between 10-year government bond rates of each country and that of German government
bond.
In De Grauwe (2011a,b) a theory of the fragility of the Eurozone is developed that explains why the
Eurozone countries are more prone to experience a sovereign debt crisis than countries that are not
part of a monetary union evenwhen these countries experience aworse ﬁscal situation. The purpose of
this paper is to provide a further empirical test of this theory.
Section 2 summarizes the main features of the fragility theory of the Eurozone and derives the
testable implications. Section 3 presents some stylized facts and Section 4 describes the econometric
testing procedure and discusses the results. We report additional tests and discuss the explanatory
power of different variables in Section 5. Section 6 derives some policy implications.
2. The fragility of the Eurozone
2.1. Theory
The key to understanding the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has to do with an essential
feature of a monetary union.1 Members of monetary union issue debt in a currency over which they
have no control. As a result the governments of these countries cannot give a guarantee that the cash
will always be available to pay out bondholders at maturity. It is literally possible that these govern-
ments ﬁnd out that the liquidity is lacking to pay out bondholders.
This is not the case in “stand-alone countries”, i.e. countries that issue debt in their own currency.
These countries can give a guarantee to the bondholders that the cash will always be available to pay
them out. The reason is that if the government were to experience a shortage of liquidity it would call
upon the central bank to provide the liquidity. And there is no limit to the capacity of a central bank to
do so.
The absence of a guarantee that the cash will always be available creates fragility in a monetary
union. Member countries are susceptible tomovements of distrust. When investors fear some payment
difﬁculty, e.g. triggered by a recession, they sell the government bonds. This has two effects. It raises the
interest rate and leads to a liquidity outﬂow as the investors who have sold the government bonds look
for safer places to invest. This “sudden stop” can lead to a situation inwhich the government cannot roll
over its deb except at prohibitive interest rates.1 See De Grauwe (2011a,b) for a more detailed analysis. See also Kopf (2011).
Fig. 2. Spreads 10-year government bond rates. Source: Datastream
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up, the country is likely to be pushed into a recession. This tends to reduce government revenues and to
increase the deﬁcit and debt levels. The combination of increasing interest rates and debt levels can
push the government into default.
There is a self-fulﬁlling element in this dynamics.When investors fear default, they act in such away
that default becomes more likely. A country can become insolvent because investors fear default.
The problem of member countries of a monetary union described in the previous paragraphs is
similar to the problems faced by emerging countries that issue debt in a foreign currency, usually the
dollar. These countries can be confronted with a “sudden stop” when capital inﬂows suddenly stop
leading to a liquidity crisis (see Calvo, 1988). This problem has been analyzed intensively by econo-
mists, who have concluded that ﬁnancial markets acquire great power in these countries and can force
them into default (see Eichengreen et al., 2005).
The liquidity crises in a monetary union also make it possible for the emergence of multiple
equilibria. Countries that are distrusted by the market are forced into a bad equilibrium characterized
by high interest rates, the need to impose strong budgetary austerity programs that push these
countries into a deep recession. Conversely, countries that are trusted become the recipients of
liquidity inﬂows that lower the interest rate and boost the economy. They are pushed into a good
equilibrium. In De Grauwe (2011a,b) a formal model inspired by the Obstfeld (1986) model of foreign
currency crises is presented inwhich multiple equilibria are a possible outcome.2 In Appendix a simple
version of this model is presented.
Finally it should also be mentioned that the fragility of member countries of a monetary union has
a similar structure as the fragility of banks. Banks are fragile because the unbalancedmaturity structure
of their assets and liabilities. The latter have shorter maturities than the former (“banks borrow short
and lend long”). As a result, banks are vulnerable to runs; when depositors fear liquidity problems they
run to the bank to convert their deposits into cash thereby precipitating the liquidity crisis that they are
fearing (see the classicmodel of bank runs of Diamond andDybvig,1983). This problem can be solved by
the central bank promising to step in and to provide liquidity in times of crisis (“lender of last resort”).
Governments in a monetary union that cannot rely on a lender of last resort face a similar fragility.
Their liabilities (bonds) are liquid and can be converted into cash quickly. The government assets
(physical assets, claims on taxpayers), however, are illiquid. In the absence of a central bank that is2 There exist many formal theoretical models that create self-fulﬁlling liquidity crises. Many of these have been developed for
explaining crises in the foreign exchange markets (see Obstfeld, 1986). Other models have been applied to the government debt
(Calvo, 1988; Gros, 2011; Corsetti and Dedola, 2011).
Fig. 3. Spreads and debt to GDP ratio in Eurozone (2000Q1–2011Q3). Source: Eurostat and datastream.
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cannot transform their assets into liquid funds quickly enough.
2.2. How to test the theory?
The theory presented in the previous section leads to some testable propositions. We have seen that
in amonetary unionmovements of distrust vis-à-vis one country lead to an increase in the government
bond rate of that country and thus to an increase in the spread (the difference) with the bond rates of
other countries. When such movements of distrust occur these spreads are likely to increase signiﬁ-
cantly without much movement of the underlying fundamentals that inﬂuence the solvency of the
country. More precisely when market sentiments turn against a country the spreads are likely to
exhibit the following features:
 Large movements in the spreads occur over short periods.
 Changes in the fundamental variables cannot account for the total change in the spreads.3
Movements in the spreads appear to be dissociated from the fundamentals.
 The changes in the spreads are clustered in time.
Thus one way to test the theory is ﬁrst to estimate a model that explains the spreads by a number of
fundamental variables. In a second stage we identify structural breaks in the model, so as to ﬁnd out
how robust the explanatory power of the model is. In a third stage we estimate the model with time
dummies. This allows us to identify periods of regime switching during whichmarket sentiments drive
the spreads away from their underlying fundamentals, and to analyze how much of the total variation
of the spreads can be accounted for by these time dummies.
In order for such a test to be convincing it will be important to analyze a control group of countries
that do not belong to a monetary union.Wewill therefore take a sample of “stand-alone” countries and
analyze whether in this control group one observes similar movements of the spreads away from their
underlying fundamentals. Our theory predicts that the crisis features we discuss above should not
happen in countries that have full control over the currency in which they issue their debt.
3. The facts about spreads and debt to GDP ratios
Before performing a rigorous econometric analysis explaining the spreads, it is useful to look at how
the spreads and the debt to GDP ratios have evolved over time in the Eurozone and in the sample of3 Note that we are not implying that fundamentals do not matter; in fact small movements of fundamentals can trigger large
movements in spreads, because they trigger the fear factor (like in a bank run).
Fig. 4. Spreads and debt to GDP ratio in Eurozone (2000Q1–2011Q3). Source: Eurostat and datastream.
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latter is the most important fundamental variable inﬂuencing the spreads (as will become clear from
our econometric analysis).
We ﬁrst present the relation between the spreads and the debt-to-GDP ratios in the Eurozone. This
is done in Fig. 3, which shows the spreads on vertical axis and the debt to GDP ratios on the horizontal
axis in the Eurozone countries. Each point is a particular observation of one of the countries in
a particular quarter (sample period 2000Q1–2011Q3). We also draw a straight line obtained from
a simple regression of the spread as a function of the debt to GDP ratio.
We observeﬁrst that there is a positive relation (represented by the positively sloped regression line)
between the spread and the debt to GDP ratio, i.e. higher spreads are associatedwith higher debt to GDP
ratios.Wewill return to this relationship and presentmore precise statistical results in the next section.
A second observation to be made from Fig. 3 is that the deviations from the fundamental line (the
regression line) appear to occur in bursts that are time dependent. We show this in Fig. 4, which is the
same as Fig. 3 but where we have highlighted all observations that are more than 3 standard deviations
from the mean in a triangle. It is striking to ﬁnd that all these observations concern three countries
(Greece, Portugal and Ireland) and that these observations are highly time dependent, i.e. the devia-
tions start at one particular moment of time and then continue to increase in the next consecutive
periods. Thus, the dramatic increases in the spreads that we observe in these countries from 2010 on do
not appear to be much related to the increase in the debt to GDP ratios during the same period. This is
as the theory predicts. We will analyze whether this results stands the scrutiny of econometric testing.
Do the same developments occur in “stand-alone” countries, i.e. countries that are not part of
a monetary union and issue debt in their own currencies? To test this, we selected countries whose
GDP per capita $ 20,000 and population 5million. There are 14 “stand-alone” developed countries4
(Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Poland, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US) in this control group. In order to make the analysis
comparablewith our analysis of the Eurozone countries, we select the same risk free government bond,
i.e. the German government bond and compute the spreads of the 10-year government bond rates. We
could also have selected the US government bond. In fact doing so leads to very similar results.
It is important to stress that the spreads between “stand-alone” countries reﬂect not only default
risk but also exchange rate risk. It is even likely that the latter dominates the default risk, as exchange
rates exhibit large ﬂuctuations thereby creating large risks resulting from these ﬂuctuations. In the4 Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are excluded because their economies are heavily dependent on oil export. Hong
Kong, Israel and Taiwan are excluded because lack of some relevant data. Slovakia is a special case as it joined the Eurozone in
2009 and should not be included in the stand-alone sample.
Fig. 5. Spreads of “stand-alone” countries (2000Q1–2011Q3). Source: OECD and datastream.
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variable of the spreads. Beforewe do this, we present the plots of the spreads and the debt to GDP ratios
in the same way as we did for the Eurozone countries in Figs. 3 and 4. The result is shown in Fig. 5.
Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 3 of the Eurozone countries we ﬁnd striking differences. A ﬁrst difference
with the Eurozone countries is that the debt to GDP ratio seems to have a very weak effect on the
spreads. Second, and most importantly, we do not detect sudden and time dependent large departures
of the spreads from its fundamental. All the observations, although volatile in the short-run, cluster
together around some constant number between 4% and 8%.
The contrast between the Eurozone countries and the sample of stand-alone countries also appears
in the occurrence of structural breaks. We split the sample between the pre- and the post ﬁnancial
crisis period. We show the results in Figs. 6 and 7.
The most striking difference is that a signiﬁcant break in the relationship between the spreads and
the debt to GDP ratio seems to have occurred in the Eurozone. While before the crisis the debt to GDP
ratios in the Eurozone do not seem to have affected the spreads (despite a large variation in these
ratios), after 2008, this relationship becomes quite signiﬁcant. This contrasts with the stand-alone
countries where the ﬁnancial crisis does not seem to have changed the relationship between
spreads and debt to GDP ratios, i.e. it appears that since the ﬁnancial crisis the link between spreads
and debt to GDP ratios has remained equally weak for the stand-alone countries. Thus, ﬁnancial
markets are not eager to impose more discipline on the stand-alone countries since the start of the
ﬁnancial crisis, while they have become very eager to do so in the Eurozone. This by itself also tends to
conﬁrm the fragility hypothesis formulated earlier, i.e. it appears that ﬁnancial markets are less tolerant
towards high debt to GDP ratios in the Eurozone than in the stand-alone countries. We also note that
after 2008 time dependent departures of the spreads from the fundamental seem to occur.
4. Implementing the testing procedure
4.1. Basic model
In our speciﬁcation of the fundamentals model we rely on the existing literature.5 The most
common fundamental variables found in this literature are variables measuring the sustainability of
government debt. Wewill use two alternative concepts, i.e. the debt to GDP ratio and the “ﬁscal space”.5 Attinasi et al. (2009), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010), Gerlach et al. (2010), Schuknecht et al. (2010), Caceres et al. (2010),
Caporale and Girardi (2011), Gibson et al. (2011), Aizenman and Hutchinson (2012), Beirne and Fratzscher (2012). There is of
course a vast literature on the spreads in the government bond markets in general. See for example the classic Eaton et al.
(1986) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000). Much of this literature has been inﬂuenced by the debt problems of emerging
economies. See for example, Edwards (1984), Edwards (1986) and Min (1999).
Fig. 6. Spreads and debt to GDP ratios in Eurozone. Source: Eurostat and datastream.
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economic growth as fundamental variables affecting the spreads. The effects of these fundamental
variables on the spreads can be described as follows.
 When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service increases leading
to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an increase in the spread, which is
a risk premium investors demand to compensate them for the increased default risk.6
 “Fiscal space” is deﬁned as the ratio of the government debt to total tax revenues. Aizenman and
Hutchinson (2012) argue that this is a better measure of debt sustainability than the debt to GDP
ratio. A country may have a low debt to GDP ratio, yet ﬁnd it difﬁcult to service its debt because of
a low capacity of raising taxes. In this case the ratio of government debt to tax revenues will be
high, i.e. it takes a lot of years to generate the tax revenues necessary to service the debt.
 The current account position has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account deﬁcits should be
interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the country as a whole (private and ofﬁcial
residents). This is also likely to increase the default risk of the government for the following reason.
If the increase in net foreign debt arises from the private sector’s overspending it will lead to
default risk of the private sector. However, the government is likely to be affected because such
defaults lead to a negative effect on economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues
and an increase in government budget deﬁcits. If the increase in net foreign indebtedness arises
from government overspending, it directly increases the government’s debt service, and thus the
default risk. To capture net foreign debt position of a country, we use the accumulated current
account GDP ratio of that country. It is computed as the current account accumulated since 2000Q1
divided by its GDP level.
 The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered as an early
warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real appreciation will run into
problems of competitiveness which in turn will lead to future current account deﬁcits, and future
debt problems. Investors may then demand an additional risk premium.
 Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing its debt. The
lower the growth rate the more difﬁcult it is to raise tax revenues. As a result a decline of economic6 We also experimented with the government deﬁcit to GDP ratio. But this variable does not have a signiﬁcant effect in any of
the regressions we estimated.
Fig. 7. Spreads and debt to GDP ratios of “stand-alone” countries. Source: OECD and datastream.
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spread.
We specify the econometric equation both in a linear and a non-linear form. The reasonwhywe also
specify a non-linear relationship between the spread and the debt to GDP ratio comes from the fact that
every decision to default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high potential losses. Thus, as the debt to
GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come closer to the default decision, making themmore
sensitive to a given increase in the debt to GDP ratio (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996).
The linear equation is speciﬁed as follows:
Iit ¼ aþ z CAit þ g Debtit þ m REEit þ d Growthit þ ai þ uit (1)
where Iit is the interest rate spread of country i in period t, CAit is the accumulated current account
deﬁcit to GDP ratio of country i in period t, and Debtit is either the government debt to GDP ratio or the
ﬁscal space of country i in period t, REEit is the real effective exchange rate, Growthit is GDP growth rate,
a is the constant term and ai is country i’s ﬁxed effect. The latter variable measures the idiosyncrasies of
a country that affect its spread and that are not time dependent. For example, the efﬁciency of the tax
system, the quality of the governance, and many other variables that are country-speciﬁc are captured
by the ﬁxed effect. The non-linear speciﬁcation is as follows:Table 1
Spread in Eurozone (2000Q1–2011Q3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accumulated current
account/GDP ratio
0.0115 [0.0070] 0.0001 [0.0058] 0.0116 [0.0067] 0.0011 [0.0056]
Real effective exchange rate 0.0119 [0.0211] 0.0121 [0.0226] 0.0060 [0.0191] 0.0005 [0.0135]
Growth rate 0.0668 [0.0476] 0.0501*** [0.0102] 0.0571[0.0397] 0.0405***[0.0058]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0744*** [0.0133] 0.0523 [0.0292]
Debt/GDP ratio squared 0.0009*** [0.0002]
Fiscal space 2.5008*** [0.4327] 1.7636*** [0.3053]
Fiscal space squared 0.9265*** [0.0841]
Country ﬁxed effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 470 470 470 470
R2 0.6696 0.7952 0.7067 0.8522
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 2
Spread in “stand-alone” countries (2000Q1–2011Q3).
(1) (2)
Accumulated current account GDP ratio 0.0012 [0.0028] 0.0023 [0.0028]
Real effective exchange rate 0.0019 [0.0081] 0.0014[0.0080]
Change in exchange rate 0.0274** [0.0095] 0.0278*** [0.0092]
Growth rate 0.0216 [0.0295] 0.0231 [0.0296]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0105 [0.0080]
Fiscal space 0.2653 [0.2127]
Country ﬁxed effect Controlled Controlled
Observations 658 658
R2 0.8418 0.8413
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A methodological note should be made here. In the existing empirical literature there has been
a tendency to add a lot of other variables on the right hand side of the two equations. In particular,
researchers have added risk measures and ratings by rating agencies as additional explanatory
variables of the spreads. The problem with this is that risk variables and ratings are unlikely to be
exogenous. When a sovereign debt crisis erupts in the Eurozone, all these increases in risk variables
(including the so-called systemic risk variables) can simply be the market reaction to the development
of the crisis. Similarly, as rating agencies tend to react to movements in spreads, the latter also are
affected by increases in the spreads. Including these variables in the regression is likely to improve the
ﬁt dramatically without however, adding to the explanation of the spreads. In fact, the addition of these
variables creates a risk of false claims that the fundamental model explains the spreads well.
After having established by a Hausman test that the random effect model is inappropriate, we used
a ﬁxed effect model. A ﬁxed effect model helps to control for unobserved time-invariant variables and
produces unbiased estimates of the “fundamental variables”. The results of estimating the linear and
non-linear models are shown in Table 1 (Eurozone) and 2 (Stand-alone countries). These results lead to
the following interpretations.
First, the debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal space variables have signiﬁcant effects on the spreads in
the Eurozone. The ﬁscal space variable appears to have a slightly higher explanatory power as can be
seen from the fact that the R2 is higher whenwe use the ﬁscal space variable instead of the debt to GDP
ratio. In contrast, the debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal space variables have little impact on the spreads in
the stand-alone countries (the coefﬁcients in Table 2 are much lower and insigniﬁcant).
Second, the non-linear speciﬁcation both for the debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal space variables
improve the ﬁt in the Eurozone countries. This can be seen from the fact that the R-square in Table 1
increases in the non-linear speciﬁcation. In addition, the squared debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal spaceTable 3
Spread and structural break in Eurozone.
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Accumulated current
account GDP ratio
0.0004 [0.0017] 0.0809*** [0.0201] 0.0003 [0.0017] 0.0726*** [0.0153]
Real effective
exchange rate
0.0135*** [0.0030] 0.2070** [0.0915] 0.0135*** [0.0030] 0.2213** [0.0882]
Growth rate 0.0005 [0.0037] 0.0053 [0.0266] 0.0010 [0.0039] 0.0124 [0.0208]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0034 [0.0030] 0.1157*** [0.0248]
Fiscal space 0.1412 [0.1187] 3.8257*** [0.6538]
Country ﬁxed effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 320 150 320 150
R2 0.6758 0.8206 0.6821 0.8358
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 4
Spread and structural break in stand-alone.
Stand-alone
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Accumulated current
account GDP ratio
0.0004 [0.0053] 0.0067 [0.0078] 0.0004 [0.0062] 0.0070 [0.0081]
Real effective
exchange rate
0.0201* [0.0100] 0.0042 [0.0105] 0.0195* [0.0102] 0.0039 [0.0108]
Growth rate 0.0151 [0.0639] 0.0123 [0.0197] 0.0151 [0.0618] 0.0104 [0.0209]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0018 [0.0139] 0.0245*** [0.0071]
Fiscal space 0.0065 [0.3600] 0.6704*** [0.1750]
Change in exchange rate 0.0563*** [0.0138] 0.0010 [0.0077] 0.0565*** [0.0136] 0.0012 [0.0076]
Country ﬁxed effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 448 210 448 210
R2 0.8342 0.9499 0.8342 0.9491
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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effect on the spreads in the Eurozone, i.e. the marginal effects on the spread are signiﬁcantly higher
when these ratios are high. The contrast with the stand-alone countries is strong as shown in Table 2. In
these countries no signiﬁcant effect of debt to GDP ratio or of ﬁscal space exists. Financial markets do
not seem to be concerned with the size of the government debt and of the ﬁscal space and their
impacts on the spreads of stand-alone countries, despite the fact that the variation of these ratios is of
a similar order of magnitude as the one observed in the Eurozone. This result tends to conﬁrm the
fragility hypothesis of the Eurozone, i.e. ﬁnancial markets are less tolerant towards high debt to GDP
ratios and ﬁscal space in the Eurozone countries than in the stand-alone.
As the theory predicts, the GDP growth rate has a negative impact on the spreads in the Eurozone. In
the stand-alone countries no signiﬁcant growth effect is detected. The other fundamental variables
(accumulated current account GDP ratio and real effective exchange rate) do not seem to have
signiﬁcant effects on the spreads, both in the Eurozone and in the stand-alone countries. The change of
exchange rate seems to have a signiﬁcant impact on the spread but the sign is not expected. The
negative sign suggests that “carry trade” has been a signiﬁcant factor, i.e. countries with low (high)
interest rates tend to experience currency depreciations (appreciations).Table 5
Spread in “stand-alone” countries and Eurozone (%).
Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Accumulated current
account GDP ratio
0.0004 [0.0049] 0.0067 [0.0078] 0.0005 [0.0058] 0.0071 [0.0081]
Accumulated current
account GDP
ratio  Eurozone
0.0010 [0.0046] 0.0740*** [0.0214] 0.0010 [0.0054] 0.0654*** [0.0172]
Real effective exchange rate 0.0201* [0.0097] 0.0036 [0.0106] 0.0194* [0.0099] 0.0031 [0.0109]
Real effective exchange
rate  Eurozone
0.0061 [0.0098] 0.1909** [0.0848] 0.0055 [0.0099] 0.2022** [0.0835]
Growth rate 0.0105 [0.0432] 0.0077 [0.0154] 0.0107 [0.0417] 0.0045 [0.0155]
Change in exchange rate 0.0558*** [0.0119] 0.0005 [0.0077] 0.0559*** [0.0118] 0.0006 [0.0076]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0018 [0.0137] 0.0241*** [0.0070]
Debt/GDP ratio  Eurozone 0.0053 [0.0143] 0.0904*** [0.0249]
Fiscal space 0.0050 [0.3594] 0.6575*** [0.1628]
Fiscal space  Eurozone 0.1424 [0.3925] 3.1180*** [0.6592]
Country ﬁxed effect Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 768 360 768 360
R2 0.8365 0.8809 0.8365 0.8888
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 6
Government bond spread regression with time component (%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stand-alone Eurozone Core Periphery Stand-alone Eurozone Core Periphery
Accumulated
current account
GDP ratio
0.0004 [0.0044] 0.0023 [0.0035] 0.0089** [0.0024] 0.0154 [0.0120] 0.0014 [0.0041] 0.0009 [0.0035] 0.0086** [0.0024] 0.0070 [0.0101]
Real effective
exchange rate
0.0059 [0.0062] 0.0018 [0.0198] 0.0418*** [0.0086] 0.0323 [0.0467] 0.0058 [0.0065] 0.0014 [0.0146] 0.0349** [0.0090] 0.0178 [0.0421]
Growth rate 0.0231 [0.0467] 0.1337*** [0.0384] 0.0028 [0.0121] 0.0959** [0.0255] 0.0274 [0.0463] 0.0786** [0.0323] 0.0007 [0.0132] 0.0935** [0.0283]
Change in
exchange rate
0.0138 [0.0094] 0.0137 [0.0091]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0111 [0.0090] 0.0492* [0.0256] 0.0581** [0.0194] 0.0745* [0.0259]
Debt/GDP
ratio squared
0.0007*** [0.0002] 0.0003** [0.0001] 0.0009** [0.0002]
Fiscal space 0.3062 [0.2198] 1.9678*** [0.4191] 2.7621** [0.7623] 2.1107* [0.7032]
Fiscal space
squared
0.8516*** [0.0762] 0.6915** [0.1792] 0.7502** [0.1698]
2010Q2 0.0783 [0.3685] 0.0335 [0.3845] 0.3949** [0.0992] 1.8918 [1.3135] 0.0926 [0.3778] 0.2086 [0.2286] 0.4520** [0.1318] 1.3120 [1.1614]
2010Q3 0.0409 [0.3697] 0.3505 [0.4737] 0.4133** [0.1412] 2.7384 [1.3757] 0.0566 [0.3788] 0.5017 [0.3884] 0.4663** [0.1715] 2.1970 [1.3693]
2010Q4 0.0560 [0.4008] 0.6231 [0.5116] 0.4660** [0.1701] 3.1818** [0.9385] 0.0728 [0.4117] 0.7423** [0.3152] 0.5274** [0.1993] 2.6768** [0.7693]
2011Q1 0.3491 [0.4019] 0.4720 [0.5217] 0.4757** [0.1706] 3.0214* [1.0092] 0.3661 [0.4108] 0.5465* [0.2817] 0.5402** [0.2018] 2.4475** [0.7494]
2011Q2 0.4859 [0.4462] 1.0227 [0.7156] 0.4810** [0.1722] 4.5222*** [0.5896] 0.5073 [0.4535] 1.1221* [0.5250] 0.5518** [0.2068] 4.0294** [0.7871]
2011Q3 0.2050 [0.4054] 1.5656* [0.7410] 1.0231* [0.4148] 5.1019** [1.3089] 0.2231 [0.4179] 1.6479** [0.6754] 1.0908* [0.4518] 4.6643* [1.4978]
Other quarterly
dummies
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Country ﬁxed
effect
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 658 470 282 188 658 470 282 188
R2 0.8594 0.8516 0.8628 0.9575 0.8598 0.9015 0.8626 0.9568
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note: Core ¼ Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands; Periphery ¼ Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain.
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The graphical analysis of the previous section suggests that a structural break occurs at the time of
the ﬁnancial crisis. A Chow test revealed that a structural break occurred in the Eurozone and the
stand-alone countries around the year 2008. This allows us to treat the pre- and post-crisis periods as
separate and we show the results in Tables 3 and 4.
In general, the results conﬁrm that since 2008 the markets become more “vigilant” towards some
key economic fundamentals which are associated with higher spreads. To be speciﬁc, in both the
Eurozone and stand-alone countries, the coefﬁcients of the debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal space
variable are low and insigniﬁcant prior to the crisis. In the post-crisis period these coefﬁcients become
larger and are statistically signiﬁcant.7 Moreover, the coefﬁcient of the real effective exchange rate is
negative prior to the crisis and this negative effect does not last any more.
However, the contrast in the post-crisis period between the Eurozone and stand-alone countries
are striking. The coefﬁcients of the debt to GDP ratio and the ﬁscal space in the Eurozone are
much larger than in the stand-alone countries. Similarly, the coefﬁcient of the real effective
exchange rate in the Eurozone is signiﬁcant, while no signiﬁcant relationship exists in the stand-alone
countries. The negative effect of accumulated current account GDP ratio in the post-crisis
becomes signiﬁcantly larger in the Eurozone while this effect remains insigniﬁcant in the stand-
alone countries.
The contrast between the Eurozone and stand-alone countries is also made clear by a pooled
regression of the Eurozone and the stand-alone countries. We do this in Table 5. We have added
four interaction variables “Debt to GDP*Eurozone”, “Fiscal Space*Eurozone”, “Real effective exchange
rate*Eurozone” and “Accumulated current account GDP ratio*Eurozone”. These interaction terms
measure thedegree towhich economic fundamental factors affect the Eurozone spreads differently from
the stand-alone countries. The results of Table 5 conﬁrm the previous results. The debt sustainability
measures, the real effective exchange rate and the accumulated current account are much stronger and
signiﬁcant variables in the Eurozone than in the stand-alone countries especially in the post-crisis
period. The stand-alone countries seem to be able to “get away with murder” and still not be disci-
plined by ﬁnancial markets.
To summarize, we ﬁnd a great contrast between the Eurozone and the stand-alone countries. In the
former, we detected a signiﬁcant increase in the effect of the debt sustainability measures, accumu-
lated current account GDP ratio and the real effective exchange rate on the spreads since 2008. Such an
increase is completely absent in the stand-alone countries. This suggests that ﬁnancial markets appear
to punish Eurozone countries more than stand-alone countries for the same imbalances. This by itself
tends to support the fragility hypothesis formulated in this paper.
4.3. Introducing time dependency
As will be remembered an important aspect of the fragility hypothesis and of its capacity to
generate self-fulﬁlling crisis is that it can lead to movements in the spreads that appear to be unrelated
to the fundamental variables of the model. We want to test this hypothesis by measuring the impor-
tance of time dependent effects on the spreads that are unrelated to the fundamentals. In order to do
so, we introduce time dependency in the basic ﬁxed effect model. In the non-linear speciﬁcation this
yields:
Iit ¼ aþ z CAit þ g1  Debtit þ m REEit þ d Growthit þ g2  ðDebtitÞ2þai þ bt þ 3it (3)
where bt is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are unrelated to the
fundamentals of the model or (by deﬁnition) to the ﬁxed effects. If signiﬁcant, it shows that the spreads
move in time unrelated to the fundamental forces driving the yields.7 Similar results are obtained by Schuknecht et al. (2010), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010), Borgy et al. (2011), Gibson et al.
(2011), Beirne and Fratzscher (2012) and Ghosh and Ostry (2012).
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estimated the model separately for two subgroups of the Eurozone, i.e. the core and the periphery. The
results are shown in Table 6. The contrast between stand-alone and Eurozone countries is striking. The
effect of the time variable in the stand-alone countries is weak. In the Eurozone we detect some
increasing positive time effect since 2010Q2. Noticeably there exist signiﬁcant and positive time effects
from 2010Q4 to 2011Q3 in both the core and periphery of the Eurozone. Thus, during the post crisis
period the spreads in the peripheral countries of the Eurozone were gripped by surges that were
independent from the underlying fundamentals.
We plot the time effects obtained from Table 6 in Figs. 8 and 9. This suggests that especially in the
periphery “departures” occurred in the spreads, i.e. an increase in the spreads that cannot be accounted
for by fundamental developments, in particular by the changes in the debt to GDP ratios and ﬁscal
space during the crisis.
This result can also be interpreted as follows. Before the crisis the markets did not see any risk in the
peripheral countries’ sovereign debt. As a result they priced the risks in the sameway as the risk of core
countries’ sovereign debt. After the crisis, spreads of the peripheral countries increased dramatically
and independent from observed fundamentals. This suggests that the markets were gripped by
negative sentiments and tended to exaggerate the default risks. Thus, mispricing of risks (in both
directions) seems to have been an endemic feature in the Eurozone.
Finally, to check the robustness of our result, we also run some other regressions that take the US
government bond as “benchmark”. The spreads are deﬁned as the differences of 10-year government
bond rates of each country and that of the US government bond. The results of the regressions and the
time component patterns are shown in Table 7. These results are consistent with our major ﬁndings.
5. Further analysis
5.1. Tests for cross-sectional independence, unit root and cointegration
The previous results suggest that a common time-dependent factor, i.e. market sentiments, inﬂu-
ences the spreads in the Eurozone. Such a common factor does not seem to inﬂuence the spreads in the
stand-alone countries. The existence of a common factor in the Eurozone spreads will create cross-
country dependence in the error terms when we estimate the Eurozone model without the
common time variables. This cross-sectional dependence should disappear when we estimate the
model with the time variables. We tested this by applying Pesaran’s test for cross-sectional indepen-
dence. In our basic model of Section 4, the null hypothesis we test is H0:cov (uit, ujt) ¼ 0, for is j.
The results are presented in Table 8. In the Eurozone sample, we observe that without the time
variables the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is rejected, while we maintain the
hypothesis of independence when time variables are included. Thus these tests reveal to us that the
empirical model with time variables is more appropriate than the one without time variables. Table 8
also conﬁrms that in the sample of stand-alone countries the error terms are not cross-sectionally
correlated. This contrasting result between the Eurozone and stand-alone country is consistent with
our fragility theory: countries linked by a monetary union can have correlated fragility in their
government bond market while no such common component exists in countries not in the monetary
union.
Finally we also performed unit root and cointegration tests to check the validity of our empirical
results. These are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The LLC, Breitung and IPS tests show that the debt
sustainability variables, the accumulated current account to GDP ratio and the real effective exchange
rate in both the Eurozone and stand-alone countries have unit roots. However, the Kao residual panel
cointegration test shows that the variables of the Eurozone model with time variables are cointegrated
and the variables in the stand-alone countries without time variables are also cointegrated.
5.2. Explanatory power analysis
In this section we analyze the quantitative importance of the fundamental variables relative to
the time dummies in explaining the changes in the spreads that have occurred from 2008Q1 to
Fig. 9. Time component (Fiscal space regression).
Fig. 8. Time component (Debt/GDP ratio regression).
Table 7
Spread (%) against US government bond (with time component).
Stand-alone Eurozone Core Periphery Stand-alone Eurozone Core Periphery
Accumulated
current account
GDP ratio
0.0007 [0.0051] 0.0023 [0.0035] 0.0089** [0.0024] 0.0154 [0.0120] 0.0021 [0.0049] 0.0009[0.0035] 0.0086** [0.0024] 0.0070 [0.0101]
Real effective
exchange rate
0.0057 [0.0079] 0.0018 [0.0198] 0.0418*** [0.0086] 0.0323 [0.0467] 0.0050 [0.0082] 0.0014 [0.0146] 0.0349** [0.0090] 0.0178 [0.0421]
Growth rate 0.0205 [0.0467] 0.1337*** [0.0384] 0.0028 [0.0121] 0.0959** [0.0255] 0.0253 [0.0466] 0.0786** [0.0323] 0.0007 [0.0132] 0.0935** [0.0283]
Change in exchange
rate again USD
0.0158 [0.0093] 0.0160* [0.0086]
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0121 [0.0084] 0.0492* [0.0256] 0.0581** [0.0194] 0.0745* [0.0259]
Debt/GDP ratio
squared
0.0007*** [0.0002] 0.0003** [0.0001] 0.0009** [0.0002]
Fiscal space 0.3398 [0.2171] 1.9678*** [0.4191] 2.7621** [0.7623] 2.1107* [0.7032]
Fiscal space
squared
0.8516*** [0.0762] 0.6915** [0.1792] 0.7502** [0.1698]
2010Q2 0.3583 [0.4579] 0.3668 [0.3845] 0.7283*** [0.0992] 2.2251 [1.3135] 0.3583 [0.4538] 0.5420** [0.2286] 0.7854*** [0.1318] 1.6453 [1.1614]
2010Q3 0.6109 [0.4636] 1.0339* [0.4737] 1.0966*** [0.1412] 3.4217* [1.3757] 0.6092 [0.4664] 1.1850** [0.3884] 1.1496*** [0.1715] 2.8803 [1.3693]
2010Q4 0.6479 [0.5019] 1.4031** [0.5116] 1.2460*** [0.1701] 3.9618** [0.9385] 0.6460 [0.5091] 1.5223*** [0.3152] 1.3074*** [0.1993] 3.4568** [0.7693]
2011Q1 0.3499 [0.4997] 1.2020** [0.5217] 1.2057*** [0.1706] 3.7514** [1.0092] 0.3504 [0.5030] 1.2765*** [0.2817] 1.2702*** [0.2018] 3.1775** [0.7494]
2011Q2 0.3566 [0.5464] 1.9560** [0.7156] 1.4144*** [0.1722] 5.4555*** [0.5896] 0.3530 [0.5500] 2.0555*** [0.5250] 1.4852*** [0.2068] 4.9627*** [0.7871]
2011Q3 0.7103 [0.5101] 2.4456*** [0.7410] 1.9031*** [0.4148] 5.9819** [1.3089] 0.7113 [0.5131] 2.5279*** [0.6754] 1.9708*** [0.4518] 5.5443** [1.4978]
Other quarterly
dummies
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Country ﬁxed
effect
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Observations 611 470 282 188 611 470 282 188
R2 0.8714 0.8708 0.9573 0.9606 0.8720 0.9142 0.9572 0.9599
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Note: Core ¼ Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands; Periphery ¼ Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain.
Table 8
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence.
Debt to GDP ratio regression Fiscal space regression
Eurozone
(without time variables)
Reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 0.000)
Reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 0.000)
Eurozone
(with time variables)
Cannot reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 1.995)*
Cannot reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 1.956)*
Stand-alone
(without time variable)
Cannot reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 1.039)*
Cannot reject cross-sectional independence
(p-value ¼ 0.551)
Note: *p-value > 1 is possible because of the two-sided p-values for non-symmetric distributions.
Table 9
Unit root test (H0 hypothesis: panel contains unit root).
Variable LLC test: p-Value Breitung test: p-Value IPS test: p-Value
Eurozone:
Spread 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Debt to GDP ratio 0.9985 1.0000 1.0000
Fiscal space 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Accumulated current account to GDP ratio 0.0321 0.9982 0.2579
Real effective exchange rate 0.2553 0.5947 0.7914
Growth rate 0.0042 0.0281 0.0277
Stand-alone:
Spread 0.0001 0.0961 0.0209
Debt to GDP ratio 0.2222 0.9940 0.9567
Fiscal space 0.4199 0.9949 0.9878
Accumulated current account to GDP ratio 0.9921 0.9994 0.9990
Real effective exchange rate 0.0378 0.3613 0.1941
Growth rate 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Change of exchange rate 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 10
Cointegration test (H0 hypothesis: no cointegration).
Debt GDP ratio regression Fiscal space regression
Eurozone (with time dummies) Reject “no cointegration”
(p-value ¼ 0.00)
Reject “no cointegration”
(p-value ¼ 0.00)
Stand-alone (without time dummies) Reject “no cointegration”
(p-value ¼ 0.00)
Reject “no cointegration”
(p-value ¼ 0.00)
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the time dummies and the residual. Their relative importance is shown in Figs. 10 and 11.
The results lead to additional insights. We observe that in Portugal and Ireland about half of the
total variation of the spreads is due to the time dummies and the other half to the fundamentals. In
the case of Spain most of the surge in the spreads is due to the time dummies. Thus in the case of
Spain the fundamentals had little to do with the increasing spread and most of the explanation
comes from the changes in market sentiments vis-a-vis Spain. The opposite holds for Greece. In
this country most of the surge in the spreads is explained by deteriorating fundamentals (about
60%) while the time dummies explain less than 40%. The contrast between Spain and Greece is
interesting. In the case of Spain it is mostly distrust that moved the spreads, while in the case of
Greece it is bad fundamentals together with the distrust. This suggests that ﬁnancial markets were
pricing the risk of Greek bonds with some ground, but may have mispriced the risk of Spanish
government bonds. Note that we observe a similar phenomenon in the cases of six core Eurozone
Fig. 10. Decomposition of change in spreads: Eurozone (2008Q1–2011Q3).
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This creates the risk that markets may be pushing Spain (and others) into a bad equilibrium,
which could be avoided by policies aimed at taking out the fear factor in the market. Elsewhere we
have argued that this could be done by Lender of Last Resort operations of the ECB (De Grauwe,
2011a,b).
The contrast between the Eurozone countries and the stand-alone countries is made clear in Figs.10
and 11. As noted earlier, in the case of the stand-alone countries there is no signiﬁcant increase in the
spreads since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis. As a result, there is very little to explain. This is remarkable
because the variation in the two variables that measure debt sustainability in these countries (debt to
GDP ratios and ﬁscal space) are at least as large as in the case of the Eurozone countries. This is shown
very vividly in Figs. 12 and 13. Thus ﬁnancial markets take the view that the build-up of the govern-
ment debt measures does not lead to a default risk in stand-alone countries. Financial markets do not
punish stand-alone countries for public debt accumulation that appear to be equally unsustainable as
in the Eurozone countries. This result also conﬁrms our hypothesis that a monetary union is fragile and
can easily be hit by negative market sentiments that in a self-fulﬁlling way can drive countries into
default.Fig. 11. Decomposition of change in spreads: Stand-alone countries (2008Q1–2011Q3).
Fig. 13. Debt to GDP ratio (pre-crisis and post-crisis).
Fig. 12. Fiscal space index (pre-crisis and post-crisis).
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An important empirical puzzle concerning the sovereign debt crisis is that it erupted in the Euro-
zone despite the fact that the ﬁscal position of the Eurozone as a whole was better than the ﬁscal
position of countries like the US and the UK that were left unscathed by the crisis. True Greece had
accumulated unsustainable debt and deﬁcit levels, but the other Eurozone countries that were hit by
the debt crisis were not in a worse ﬁscal position than the US and the UK.
Our explanation of this puzzle is along the lines developed in De Grauwe (2011a,b), who argues that
government bond markets in a monetary union are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulﬁlling
liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. The reason is that as the latter issue their own money,
they give a guarantee to bondholders that the cashwill always be available atmaturity. Themembers of
a monetary union cannot give such a guarantee and as a result are more vulnerable to negative market
sentiments that in a self-fulﬁlling way can create a liquidity crisis. The purpose of this paper was to
develop a test of this fragility hypothesis.
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spreads of the peripheral Eurozone countries during 2010–11 was disconnected from underlying
increases in the debt to GDP ratios and ﬁscal space, and was the result of time dependent negative
market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. The exception is Greece where we
found that the major increase in the spread was due to deteriorating fundamentals. The stand-alone
countries in our sample have been immune from these liquidity crises and weathered the storm
without the increases in the spread.
We also found evidence that after years of neglecting high debt to GDP ratios, investors became
increasingly worried about the high debt to GDP ratios in the Eurozone, and reacted by raising the
spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt to GDP ratios
were equally high and increasing in these countries. This result can also be said to validate the fragility
hypothesis, i.e. the markets appear to be less tolerant towards large public debt accumulations in the
Eurozone than towards equally large public debt accumulations in the stand-alone countries.
Thus, the story of the Eurozone is also a story of self-fulﬁlling debt crises, which in turn lead to
multiple equilibria. Countries that are hit by a liquidity crisis are forced to apply stringent austerity
measures that force them into a recession, thereby reducing the effectiveness of these austerity
programs. There is a risk that the combination of high interest rates and deep recessions turn the
liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis.
In a world where spreads are tightly linked to the underlying fundamentals such as the debt to GDP
ratio and ﬁscal space, the only option the policy makers have in reducing the spreads is to improve the
fundamentals. This implies measures aimed at reducing the debt burden. If, however, there can be
a disconnection between the spreads and the fundamentals, a policy geared exclusively towards
affecting the fundamentals (i.e. reducing the debt burden) will not be sufﬁcient. In that case policy
makers should also try to stop countries from being driven into a bad equilibrium. This can be achieved
by more active liquidity policies by the ECB that aim at preventing a liquidity crisis from leading to
a self-fulﬁlling solvency crisis (De Grauwe, 2011a,b).Acknowledgements
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Appendix A. A Model of good and bad equilibria
We present a very simple model illustrating how multiple equilibria can arise. The starting point is
that there is a cost and a beneﬁt of defaulting on the debt, and that investors take this calculus of the
sovereign into account. This is represented in Fig. 14. We will assume that the country involved isFig. 14. Cost and beneﬁts of default after a solvency shock.
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a recession, or a loss of competitiveness. We call this a solvency shock. The higher this shock the greater
is the loss of solvency. We concentrate ﬁrst on the beneﬁt side. On the horizontal axis we show the
solvency shock. On the vertical axis we represent the beneﬁt of defaulting. There are many ways and
degrees of defaulting. To simplify we assume this takes the form of a haircut of a ﬁxed percentage. The
beneﬁt of defaulting in this way is that the government can reduce the interest burden on the
outstanding debt. As a result, after the default it will have to apply less austerity, i.e. it will have to
reduce spending and/or increase taxes by less than without the default. Since austerity is politically
costly, the government proﬁts from the default.
A major insight of the model is that the beneﬁt of a default depends on whether this default is
expected or not. We show two curves representing the beneﬁt of a default. BU is the beneﬁt of a default
that investors do not expect to happen, while BE is the beneﬁt of a default that investors expect to
happen. Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the BU curve. It is upward sloping because when the solvency shock
increases, the beneﬁt of a default for the sovereign goes up. The reason is that when the solvency
shock is large, i.e. the decline in tax income is large, the cost of austerity is substantial. Default then
becomes more attractive for the sovereign. We have drawn this curve to be non-linear, but this is not
essential for the argument. We distinguish three factors that affect the position and the steepness of
the BU curve:
 The initial debt level. The higher is this level, the higher is the beneﬁt of a default. Thus with a higher
initial debt level the BU curve will rotate upwards.
 The efﬁciency of the tax system. In a country with an inefﬁcient tax system, the government cannot
easily increase taxation. Thus in such a country the option of defaulting becomes more attractive.
The BU curve rotates upwards.
 The size of the external debt. When external debt takes a large proportion of total debt there will be
less domestic political resistance against default, making the latter more attractive (the BU curve
rotates upwards).
We now concentrate on the BE curve. This shows the beneﬁt of a default when investors anticipate
such a default. It is located above the BU curve for the following reason. When investors expect
a default, theywill sell government bonds. As a result, the interest rate on government bonds increases.
This raises the government budget deﬁcit requiring a more intense austerity program of spending cuts
and tax hikes. Thus, default becomes more attractive. For every solvency shock, the beneﬁts of default
will be higher than they were when the default was not anticipated.
We now introduce the cost side of the default in Fig.14. The cost of a default arises from the fact that,
when defaulting, the government suffers a loss of reputation. This loss of reputation will make it
difﬁcult for the government to borrow in the future.Wewill make the simplifying assumption that this
is a ﬁxed cost (C).
We now have the tools to analyze the equilibrium of the model. We will distinguish between three
types of solvency shocks, a small one, an intermediate one, and a large one. Take a small solvency
shock: this is a shock S < S1 (this could be the shocks that Germany and the Netherlands experienced
during the debt crisis). For this small shock the cost of a default is always larger than the beneﬁts (both
of an expected and an unexpected default). Thus the government will not want to default. When
expectations are rational investors will not expect a default. As a result, a no-default equilibrium can be
sustained.
Let us now analyze a large solvency shock. This is one for which S > S2 (this could be the shock
experienced by Greece). For all these large shockswe observe that the cost of a default is always smaller
than the beneﬁts (both of an expected and an unexpected default). The government will want to
default. In a rational expectations framework, investors will anticipate this. As a result, a default is
inevitable.
We now turn to the intermediate case: S1 < S < S2 (this could be the shocks that Ireland, Portugal
and Spain experienced). For these intermediate shocks we obtain an indeterminacy, i.e. two equilibria
are possible. Which one will prevail depends on what is expected. Suppose the solvency shock is S0 (in
Fig. 15). In this case there are two potential equilibria, D and N. Take point D, investors expect a default
Fig. 15. Good and bad equilibria.
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Thus, the government will default. D is an equilibrium that is consistent with expectations.
But point N is an equally good candidate to be an equilibrium point. In N, investors do not expect
a default (N is on the BU line). As a result, the beneﬁt of a default is lower than the cost. Thus the
government will not default. It follows that N is also an equilibrium point that is consistent with
expectations.
Thus we obtain two possible equilibria, a bad one (D) that leads to default, a good one (N) that
does not lead to default. Both are equally possible. The selection of one of these two points only
depends on what investors expect. If the latter expect a default, there will be one; if they do not
expect a default there will be none. This remarkable result is due to the self-fulﬁlling nature of
expectations.
Since there is a lot of uncertainty about the likelihood of default, and since investors have very little
scientiﬁc foundation to calculate probabilities of default (there has been none inWestern Europe in the
last 60 years), expectations are likely to be driven mainly by market sentiments of optimism and
pessimism. Small changes in these market sentiments can lead to large movements from one type of
equilibrium to another.
The possibility of multiple equilibria is unlikely to occur when the country is a stand-alone country,
i.e. when it can issue sovereign debt in its own currency. This makes it possible for the country to
always avoid outright default because the central bank can be forced to provide all the liquidity that is
necessary to avoid such an outcome. This has the effect that there is only one beneﬁt curve. In this case
the government can still decide to default (if the solvency shock is large enough). But the country
cannot be forced to do so by the whim of market expectations.References
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